Vilém Skopal

During the 19^th century, knowledge of Asian traditions labelled with the general category of Buddhism spread rapidly among Europeans. This was caused by at least two pursuits of modern European intelligentsia: the establishment of the academic field of Buddhist Studies, and the growing enthusiasm for Buddhist thought and practices. Otakar Pertold (1884-1965), Czech orientalist and the founder of Czech Studies of Religion, was well aware of the situation, and in his article Is Buddhism a religion convenient for Europeans? (1911) formulates his reaction to this trend. The scope of this post is to comment on this article, which was published on the Digital Platform of the COST Action ESIND in English translation, by providing first, an outline of the two modern pursuits that serve as the conceptual framework for Pertold’s article, and second, to show Pertold’s conceptualisation of Buddhism and how it both aligns with and distances itself from the broader modern background.

In this brief post, I do not want to go deep into the question on whether Buddhism was invented by Europeans in the 19^th century (as argued by, e.g., Almond 1988 and Droit 1997), or whether it was known by Jesuit missionaries in Japan and China as early as the 16^th century (as argued by, e.g., App 2014 and Rubiés 2020); to untangle the question, a better understanding of the arguments of both sides is necessary. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that it was during the 19^th century that Buddhism started to be attractive to many Europeans as an alternative to traditional religions; before that time, it was mostly understood as an idolatry or a nihilistic philosophy unworthy of following.

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One of the conditions for the attractiveness of Buddhism in Europe was the establishment of the systematic academic study of Buddhism. This goes back to three prominent figures of early Buddhist Studies. Sándor Csoma de Kőrösi (1784-1842) and Brian H. Hodgson (1801-1894) travelled to Tibet and Nepal and collected a massive number of various manuscripts in both Sanskrit and Tibetan languages. These manuscripts were sent to, among others, Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852), who used them as one of the main sources for his monograph Introduction à l’histoire du Bouddhisme indien (1844), which is considered the foundational work of Buddhist Studies in Europe. The endeavour of the three prominent figures of early Buddhist Studies was accompanied by the foundation of two monumental collections: Max Mülelr’s Sacred Books of the East (1879–1910), which includes many translations of both Pali and Sanskrit sources, and Rhys–Davids’ Pali Text Society (est. 1881), the first European systematic effort to edit and translate the Pali Canon of Theravada Buddhism. There were, of course, other scholars who significantly influenced the early Buddhist studies, such as Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids (1857–1942), Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1869–1938), Theodor Stcherbatsky (1866–1942), and Jean-Pierre Abel-Rémusat (1788–1832). Most of the scholars of the time, with some exceptions, such as Abel-Rémusat, based their knowledge of Buddhism dominantly on textual sources. Therefore, in the early stages of its academic reception, the representation of Buddhism focused mainly on its philosophical aspects described in the texts, while other aspects, such as ritual or meditative practices, were mostly ignored. In more recent years, this one-sidedness of early Buddhist Studies has been noticed, partially analysed, and often criticised (viz e.g. Almond 1988, 24–25; Droit, 2003; Hallisey, 1995; Lopez 1995; Schopen 1991).

It is noteworthy that although criticism of textocentrism is common in contemporary post-colonial studies, which dates back to E. Said’s Orientalism (1978), it is also present in Pertold’s article from 1911. But Pertold’s intention was neither to understand the history of Buddhist Studies nor to define new methods of research, but to criticise Buddhism as both a religion and a moral code. In his view, those who favour Buddhism because of its morality cling not to ethics of living Buddhist traditions, which are in his view far from examples of morally good behaviour, but to a system constructed on teachings found in texts. The problem here is, according to Pertold, threefold: firstly, it is unclear whether thus–constructed morality was taught by Shakyamuni himself; secondly, if a European wishes to leave European religions, it would be better to adhere to one of the European philosophies, which are closer to his understanding; thirdly, the ideal morality of books lacks any binding legal regulations containing a penal code, that would apply in the event of a rule violation. Pertold grounds the last point in his experience from Sri Lanka, where both monastic and lay Buddhists do not at all follow the moral code described to them (i.e. dasa- and panca-sila), and monks can leave the monastic code (i.e. patimokkha) at any time they find it suitable. But it is Buddhism of these lands that most often causes Europeans to leave their homes to become bhikkhus. Thus, in his article, Pertold indirectly accuses European enthusiasts of Buddhism of a certain naivety and romanticism, because they do not adhere to living Buddhist traditions, but to their own ideas about Buddhist morality.

Let us now look at the reasons of those Europeans who favoured Buddhism for its assumed modern nature. These modern enthusiasts for Buddhism – generally called Neobuddhists – considered Buddhism as an atheistic, empirical, and anti–speculative religion, built on the law of nature (dharma) guided by moral actions (karman), and which is, as such, compatible with Darwinian science; religion declaring individual morality, according to which humans should take care of their spiritual needs by themselves; religion with a founder who embodies all the above–mentioned qualities; and, last but not least, a religion with strong Protestant and anti–Catholic connotations (Clausen 1975: 4-7). It should be emphasized that the idea of atheism not as a deplorable heresy, common in theological circles, but as an interesting religious alternative enabling morality without god was made possible by the dynamics of the modern conceptualisation of religion. It was this modern structure of meanings that comprises and connects concepts of individualism, scientism, and empiricism with morality and reluctance to dismiss religion whatsoever. Nevertheless, this modern conceptual structure depends on the criticism of Christianity which, according to many, did not adequately respond to challenges of modernity. Thus, the dynamics of a Christian worldview played a crucial role in forming the modern reception of Buddhism, of which Neobuddhism is a part.

One of the most influential philosophers who contributed to the spread of Buddhism in Europe was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), whom Pertold also mentions in the article. Schopenhauer understands his philosophy as in accordance with Buddhism, while at the same time independent of it, because there was just scarce knowledge of it at the time when he was composing his works (Schopenhauer 1998[2], 122–3). According to Schopenhauer, the most significant similarity between Buddhism and his own philosophy lies in the negativity of both. For him, negativity does not mean any nihilism, but, on the contrary, a description of the absolute, which is inaccessible to the common human perspective, i.e., from the position of Will and Representation. Only by negation of Will – and thus of Representation as well – one can attain the cessation of suffering. This is, in his view, the description of nirvana, which aligns completely with his own notion of the goal of the human striving (Schopenhauer 1998[1], 324–325; 1998[2], 373).

Despite the undisputable influence of Schopenhauer on subsequent generations of both Neobuddhists and scholars, probably the most significant environment Neobuddhists came from was hermetism, most notably the circles around the Theosophic Society, established in 1875 by Russian count H. P. Blavatsky (1831–1891) and American colonel H. S. Olcott (1932–1907). The basic theosophic assumption in understanding of not only Buddhism but of all religions was universalism, expressed in the society’s motto “The is no religion higher than Truth.” This means that, beneath the diversity of religions, there is one hidden Truth, which is, at the same time, the foundation of all religions. Nevertheless, for both Blavatsky and Olcott, Buddhism played a prominent role, because they understood it as the best expression of this occult Truth.

In his Buddhist Catechism (1881), Olcott defines Buddhism as a scientific religion – not a revealed one – grounded in rational, pragmatic, and individual attitudes (such as expressed in Kalamasutta), as a religion with high social and moral virtues (such as the teachings on equanimity of genders and retribution of actions, i.e. karman), and as a religion free of idol–worship and ceremonies of various kinds; these are present only in degenerated forms of folk Buddhism. Thus understood, Buddhism is, of course, grounded in and dependent on the orientalist representation of Buddhism, which is based solely on Buddhism’s textual sources, mainly those of the Pali Canon (McMahan 2004, 908-912, Franklin 2008, 50–63). Theosophic conception of Buddhism is, therefore, consistent with modern demands on religion, with the emphasis on individualism, rationalism, scientism, and pragmatism, yet with high morality grounded in philosophical thought free of any tendency towards ritualism.

Theosophic representation of Buddhism strongly influenced modern Sri Lankan Buddhist movements. Most importantly, both Blavatsky and Olcott motivated Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) in his revivalist activities, which uplifted the spread of Buddhism to the West. In 1891, Dharmapala established the Maha Bodhi Society “for the purpose of resuscitation of Buddhism in India and of restoring the ancient Buddhist shrines at Buddha Gaya, Sarnath, and Kushinara” (MBS: Pioneer International Buddhist Organisation). The result of Dharmapala’s effort is a form of Buddhism called “Protestant Buddhism” (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988). This form of Buddhism is “protestant” in two respects: it sharply criticises both Christian missionary work and colonialism for their endeavour to weaken Buddhism, and it lays emphasis on individual praxis and freedom of conscience. Therefore, traditional ritual practices and the other performative side of Buddhist traditions in Sri Lanka are, from this perspective, seen as alien influences concealing the original moral, progressive, and modern teaching.

There were other Neobuddhists who were not directly linked with the Theosophical Society, but who shared with them the broader modernistic framework. For example, Paul Carus (1852–1919) bases his understanding of Buddhism on his idea of Religion of Science, i.e., the idea that religion is by its nature compatible with theories of natural law, Darwinian evolution, and psychology. Buddhism, in his view, is a religion closest to this idea for it includes essentials of Enlightenment rationalism (McMahan 2004, 913–917). Similarly, Paul Dahlke (1865–1928) envisioned Buddhism, for its high morality and modern, scientific, and individualistic nature, as the religion of the future (Lesný 1948, 416).

In his article Is Buddhism a religion convenient for Europeans?, Otakar Pertold sharply criticises the Neobuddhism. What is important, however, is that Pertold stays within the limits of the modern European discourse on Buddhism by at least two aspects: by considering the original Buddhism of Shakyamuni as atheism, and by demanding Buddhism to take a stance on morality. Despite there are other important aspects of modern reception of Buddhism, such as the above–mentioned individualism, scientism, empiricism, and antipathy to ritual, I will restrict the focus of the subsequent text to these two, since these are directly mentioned in Pertold’s article.

Pertold agrees with Neobuddhists on the atheistic nature of Buddhism and supports this view by a short comparison of the Czech term bůh (English god; in the subsequent text, I will use the English version since the argument does not require the original), Indian deva, Latin deus, and Greek theos. He concludes that the term deva, which is very frequent in Buddhist scriptures, by no means corresponds to the other terms. The main reason is that devas are not transcendental, all–powerful beings, but beings just slightly more powerful than humans. Moreover, humans can gain such powers, i.e. by the practice of asceticism, which enables them to suppress the will of devas. Thus, these “gods” are not real gods, and Buddhism is atheism. A necessary consequence of atheism is, according to Pertold, a lack of worship and cultic behaviour in early Buddhism. Shakyamuni rejected the old Brahmanical gods and ritualism and based his teachings on his own authority. But this authority was not religious, but that of one who has attained the final liberation from suffering and whose instructions should be followed.

Let me just briefly comment on Pertold’s comparative method. The main problem lies in the assumption serving him as the starting point of the comparison, i.e. that all these terms (god, deva, deus, theos) are comparable because of the shared meaning they carry. In other words, all terms signify the same concept. It is not clear why it should be so since he does not provide any argument nor evidence to support this claim. Moreover, the meaning assumed by Pertold is clearly based on the Judeo-Christian conception of God. While this assumption might be justifiable with regard to the terms from European languages, it is not clear why it should hold for the term from a different cultural milieu. In my opinion, Pertold commits a category mistake when assuming the relevance of the concept of god for Buddhism without properly formulating arguments or showing evidence that the assumption is justifiable. Moreover, since Pertold does not provide such support for his assumption, he anticipates its intelligibility for his readers. This points to a shared European expectation that Buddhism is in one way or another concerned with the concept of god.

While for Neobuddhists the atheistic nature of Buddhism is one of its advantages over Christianity, Pertold uses his findings to argue that Buddhism, in the original intention of Sakyamuni Buddha, is not a religion. It is important here to note that the Czech etymology of the word religion (náboženství in Czech) implies a relation to god (bůh in Czech), and Pertold uses this notion as the starting point in his theorising about religion (Pertold 1920, 28). Thus, when he emphasises that Buddhism is not a religion “in our sense of the word”, he refers to this idea.

Nevertheless, it has to be noted that Pertold admits the existence of an atheistic religion, even though he does not mention it in the article. According to his theory, religion originates from the belief in mana, a sacred force operating in the cosmos and ruling all happenings. According to the development of reflexive thinking about the nature of this sacred power, religion gradually develops into animism, fetishism, theism, and polytheism. When polytheism is established, philosophy and scientific thinking start to ponder the origin of all things, and one of the two positions is formulated: pluralism (each phenomenon has its own cause, i.e. expansion of polytheism) or monism (one cause of all). If monism assumes spirit as the cause, then matter is considered an illusion, and pantheism emerges; if, on the other hand, matter is considered the only cause, while the existence of spirit is questioned, we see the rise atheism (Pertold 1947, 81–88).

 Since Shakyamuni does not include gods and spirits into his teachings and claims that the truth of his teaching is independent of the existence of gods, Buddhism, in the intentions of its founder, is atheism (Pertold 1947, 87). In the present article, Pertold even questions whether Buddhism is a religion at all, since it knows no god. But he is quick to argue that contemporary Buddhist traditions are indeed religions, because they satisfy humans’ religious needs by including deities that can be worshipped (buddhas and bodhisattvas in the North, folk deities in the South). But these cannot be found in the original atheistic teachings of Shakyamuni.

While Pertold consents with Neobuddhists on the atheistic nature of Buddhism, he strongly disagrees with them on the question of whether Buddhism is also a morally sound system. Pertold’s rejection of this enthusiasm is based on two grounds: criticism of orientalist textocentrism, and his ethnographic experience from Sri Lanka, India, and Myanmar.

As noted above, textocentrism is part of contemporary criticism of orientalism, and Pertold, in his own way, anticipates it by pointing out that the idea of high Buddhist morality is based purely on textual evidence and, therefore, it is not clear whether it was taught by Shakyamuni himself. Moreover, there is no penal code in Buddhism, enforcing observance of the basic moral rules.

Pertold encountered the behaviour of members of Buddhist societies in several Asian countries, most notably in Sri Lanka. Even though Pertold, at several places, acknowledges the nobility of the official moral code, as expressed in the ten ethical regulations (dasasila), he understands contemporary behaviour of Buddhists as a degeneration of this originally good morality. Bhikkhus outsmart these regulations so that they do not need to follow them so strictly. They, for example, use money, which is prohibited, but avoid contact with it by covering it with clothes. This is based on commentary literature, which says, that touching money pollutes. On the other hand, lay adherents are not by any legislation forced to follow the regulations – themselves softened for the laity – and thus, morality is very low among Buddhists in Sri Lanka. In conclusion, Pertold claims that Buddhist is not a suitable religion for Europeans, and those who find it appealing chase an illusion based on textual and, thus, intellectual construction of the teachings of Shakyamuni Buddha.

Despite differences, Pertold and the Neobuddhists share some conceptions that point to the more basic meaning structure of the modern European discourse on Buddhism. The two of these conceptions, provable by Pertold’s article, are Buddhist atheism and morality. I suggest that these two conceptions play a crucial role in the limitation of the modern conceptualisation of Buddhism: Buddhism had to answer the question of what its relation to god is and what its morality is in order to be defined any further as either religion, science, or philosophy; or to be accepted or rejected.  It is important to remember that these questions are founded on modern European demands on religion, which conceptually depend on criticism of Christianity for its inadequate response to the challenges of modernity.

It is also plausible to suggest that Pertold’s harsh condemnation of living Buddhist traditions was allowed by the modern framework. The growing knowledge of Buddhist traditions in the 19^th century was both dependent on and restricted by this framework; without it, the conceptualisation of Buddhism would differ considerably from the one described above. This implies that Pertold’s criticism was enabled by the meaning structure of the modern discourse on religion. Without it, Pertold would not, most probably, consider living Buddhist traditions as instances of immoral atheism unworthy of following by modern Europeans.

As it is well known, in any description one can find more about the one describing than about the object described. It holds true for the modern European conceptualisation of Buddhism as well. The importance of the two conceptions of atheism and morality points to the historical circumstance into which the spread of knowledge about Buddhism entered. Both Pertold’s and Neobuddhists’ conceptualisation of Buddhism mirror what important issues concerning religion were debated at the time. And they show that the conceptualization of god and the need for sound morality were of crucial importance. The subsequent research into European conceptualisation of Buddhism should probe more deeply into the debates on these issues and take also other aspects (such as scientism, empiricism, and individualism) into consideration. What positions explaining Buddhism were formulated by using these fundamental conceptions? How did these positions influence European thinking about Buddhism in the subsequent century? Importantly, are there any alternative descriptions of Buddhism lacking these conceptions and thus differentiating from the general structure of meanings? What can all these descriptions tell us about Europeans and their ideas about religion, society, and human beings?

References

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